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Europe’s Political Mainstream Gets A Wake-Up Call !

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The resounding gains made by the anti-EU parties in last week’s European parliamentary elections have alerted Europe’s mainstream leadership to its fundamentally precarious position. This is a warning Stratfor sounded more than two years ago, when we predicted the rise of the far right and cautioned that these fringe groups should not be underestimated, precisely because they were tapping into very real and deepening sentiments that emerged from the economic and social malaise that has developed since 2008.

The highest levels of European leadership are finally and unequivocally feeling the political consequences of years of unemployment and stagnating growth across much of the continent. The dismal election results for many of the mainstream European parties (particularly in France, Spain and the United Kingdom) overshadowed the small but much-lauded gross domestic product growth figures for the year to date that dominated headlines until last week.

The current European leadership sees the rapid rise of Euroskeptical parties as an existential threat to the postwar order in Europe. This is not only because of old specters of Europe’s bloody nationalist past, but also because the economic and financial stability of the continent has been rigged (sometimes haphazardly) around the open market and common currency that these Euroskeptical parties want to recuse.

Russia Examines Its Options for Responding to Ukraine.

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The fall of the Ukrainian government and its replacement with one that appears to be oriented toward the West represents a major defeat for the Russian Federation. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia accepted the reality that the former Eastern European satellite states would be absorbed into the Western economic and political systems. Moscow claims to have been assured that former Soviet republics would be left as a neutral buffer zone and not absorbed. Washington and others have disputed that this was promised. In any case, it was rendered meaningless when the Baltic states were admitted to NATO and the European Union. The result was that NATO, which had been almost 1,600 kilometers (1,000 miles) from St. Petersburg, was now less than approximately 160 kilometers away.

This left Belarus and Ukraine as buffers. Ukraine is about 480 kilometers from Moscow at its closest point. Were Belarus and Ukraine both admitted to NATO, the city of Smolensk, which had been deep inside the Soviet Union, would have become a border town. Russia has historically protected itself with its depth. It moved its borders as far west as possible, and that depth deterred adventurers — or, as it did with Hitler and Napoleon, destroyed them. The loss of Ukraine as a buffer to the West leaves Russia without that depth and hostage to the intentions and capabilities of Europe and the United States.

There are those in the West who dismiss Russia’s fears as archaic. No one wishes to invade Russia, and no one can invade Russia. Such views appear sophisticated but are in fact simplistic. Intent means relatively little in terms of assessing threats. They can change very fast. So too can capabilities. The American performance in World War I and the German performance in the 1930s show how quickly threats and capabilities shift. In 1932, Germany was a shambles economically and militarily. By 1938, it was the dominant economic and military power on the European Peninsula. In 1941, it was at the gates of Moscow. In 1916, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson ran a sincere anti-war campaign in a country with hardly any army. In 1917, he deployed more than a million American soldiers to Europe.

Russia’s viewpoint is appropriately pessimistic. If Russia loses Belarus or Ukraine, it loses its strategic depth, which accounts for much of its ability to defend the Russian heartland. If the intention of the West is not hostile, then why is it so eager to see the regime in Ukraine transformed? It may be a profound love of liberal democracy, but from Moscow’s perspective, Russia must assume more sinister motives.

Quite apart from the question of invasion, which is obviously a distant one, Russia is concerned about the consequences of Ukraine’s joining the West and the potential for contagion in parts of Russia itself. During the 1990s, there were several secessionist movements in Russia. The Chechens became violent, and the rest of their secession story is well known. But there also was talk of secession in Karelia, in Russia’s northwest, and in the Pacific Maritime region.

What was conceivable under Boris Yeltsin was made inconceivable under Vladimir Putin. The strategy Putin adopted was to increase Russia’s strength moderately but systematically, to make that modest increase appear disproportionately large. Russia could not afford to remain on the defensive; the forces around it were too powerful. Putin had to magnify Russia’s strength, and he did. Using energy exports, the weakness of Europe and the United States’ distraction in the Middle East, he created a sense of growing Russian power. Putin ended talk of secession in the Russian Federation. He worked to create regimes in Belarus and Ukraine that retained a great deal of domestic autonomy but operated within a foreign policy framework acceptable to Russia. Moscow went further, projecting its power into the Middle East and, in the Syrian civil war, appearing to force the United States to back out of its strategy.

It is not clear what happened in Kiev. There were of course many organizations funded by American and European money that were committed to a reform government. It is irrelevant whether, as the Russians charge, these organizations planned and fomented the uprising against former President Viktor Yanukovich’s regime or whether that uprising was part of a more powerful indigenous movement that drew these groups along. The fact was that Yanukovich refused to sign an agreement moving Ukraine closer to the European Union, the demonstrations took place, there was violence, and an openly pro-Western Ukrainian government was put in place.

The Russians cannot simply allow this to stand. Not only does it create a new geopolitical reality, but in the longer term it also gives the appearance inside Russia that Putin is weaker than he seems and opens the door to instability and even fragmentation. Therefore, the Russians must respond. The issue is how.

Russia’s Potential Responses

The first step was simply making official what has been a reality. Crimea is within the Russian sphere of influence, and the military force Moscow has based in Crimea under treaties could assert control whenever it wished. That Sevastopol is a critical Russian naval base for operations in the Black and Mediterranean seas was not the key. A treaty protected that. But intervention in Crimea was a low-risk, low-cost action that would halt the appearance that Russia was hemorrhaging power. It made Russia appear as a bully in the West and a victor at home. That was precisely the image it wanted to project to compensate for its defeat.

Several options are now available to Russia.

First, it can do nothing. The government in Kiev is highly fractious, and given the pro-Russian factions’ hostility toward moving closer to the West, the probability of paralysis is high. In due course, Russian influence, money and covert activities can recreate the prior neutrality in Ukraine in the form of a stalemate. This was the game Russia played after the 2004 Orange Revolution. The problem with this strategy is that it requires patience at a time when the Russian government must demonstrate its power to its citizens and the world. Moreover, if Crimea does leave Ukraine, it will weaken the pro-Russian bloc in Kiev and remove a large number of ethnic Tartars from Ukraine’s political morass. It could be enough of a loss to allow the pro-Russian bloc to lose what electoral power it previously had (Yanukovich beat Yulia Timoshenko by fewer than a million votes in 2010). Thus, by supporting Crimea’s independence — and raising the specter of an aggressive Russia that could bind the other anti-Russian factions together — Putin could be helping to ensure that a pro-Western Ukraine persists.

Second, it can invade mainland Ukraine. There are three problems with this. First, Ukraine is a large area to seize and pacify. Russia does not need an insurgency on its border, and it cannot guarantee that it wouldn’t get one, especially since a significant portion of the population in western Ukraine is pro-West. Second, in order for an invasion of Ukraine to be geopolitically significant, all of Ukraine east of the Dnieper River must be taken. Otherwise, the frontier with Russia remains open, and there would be no anchor to the Russian position. However, this would bring Russian forces to the bank opposite Kiev and create a direct border with NATO and EU members. Finally, if the Russians wish to pursue the first option, pulling eastern Ukrainian voters out of the Ukrainian electoral process would increase the likelihood of an effective anti-Russian government.

Third, it can act along its periphery. In 2008, Russia announced its power with authority by invading Georgia. This changed calculations in Kiev and other capitals in the region by reminding them of two realities. First, Russian power is near. Second, the Europeans have no power, and the Americans are far away. There are three major points where the Russians could apply pressure: the Caucasus countries, Moldova and the Baltics. By using large Russian minority populations within NATO countries, the Russians might be able to create unrest there, driving home the limits of NATO’s power.

Fourth, it can offer incentives in Eastern and Central Europe. Eastern and Central European countries, from Poland to Bulgaria, are increasingly aware that they may have to hedge their bets on Europe and the West. The European economic crisis now affects politico-military relations. The sheer fragmentation of European nations makes a coherent response beyond proclamations impossible. Massive cuts in military spending remove most military options. The Central Europeans feel economically and strategically uneasy, particularly as the European crisis is making the European Union’s largest political powers focus on the problems of the eurozone, of which most of these countries are not members. The Russians have been conducting what we call commercial imperialism, particularly south of Poland, entering into business dealings that have increased their influence and solved some economic problems. The Russians have sufficient financial reserves to neutralize Central European countries.

Last, it can bring pressure to bear on the United States by creating problems in critical areas. An obvious place is Iran. In recent weeks, the Russians have offered to build two new, non-military reactors for the Iranians. Quietly providing technological support for military nuclear programs could cause the Iranians to end negotiations with the United States and would certainly be detected by U.S. intelligence. The United States has invested a great deal of effort and political capital in its relations with the Iranians. The Russians are in a position to damage them, especially as the Iranians are looking for leverage in their talks with Washington. In more extreme and unlikely examples, the Russians might offer help to Venezuela’s weakening regime. There are places that Russia can hurt the United States, and it is now in a position where it will take risks — as with Iran’s nuclear program — that it would not have taken before.

The European and American strategy to control the Russians has been to threaten sanctions. The problem is that Russia is the world’s eighth-largest economy, and its finances are entangled with the West’s, as is its economy. For any sanctions the West would impose, the Russians have a counter. There are many Western firms that have made large investments in Russia and have large Russian bank accounts and massive amounts of equipment in the country. The Russians can also cut off natural gas and oil shipments. This would of course hurt Russia financially, but the impact on Europe — and global oil markets — would be more sudden and difficult to manage. Some have argued that U.S. energy or European shale could solve the problem. The Russian advantage is that any such solution is years away, and Europe would not have years to wait for the cavalry to arrive. Some symbolic sanctions coupled with symbolic counter-sanctions are possible, but bringing the Russian economy to its knees without massive collateral damage would be hard.

The most likely strategy Russia will follow is a combination of all of the above: pressure on mainland Ukraine with some limited incursions; working to create unrest in the Baltics, where large Russian-speaking minorities live, and in the Caucasus and Moldova; and pursuing a strategy to prevent Eastern Europe from coalescing into a single entity. Simultaneously, Russia is likely to intervene in areas that are sensitive to the United States while allowing the Ukrainian government to be undermined by its natural divisions.

Considering the West’s Countermoves

In all of these things there are two questions. The first is what German foreign policy is going to be. Berlin supported the uprising in Ukraine and has on occasion opposed the Russian response, but it is not in a position to do anything more concrete. So far, it has tried to straddle the divides, particularly between Russia and the European Union, wanting to be at one with all. The West has now posed a problem to the Russians that Moscow must respond to visibly. If Germany effectively ignores Russia, Berlin will face two problems. The first will be that the Eastern Europeans, particularly the Poles, will lose massive confidence in Germany as a NATO ally, particularly if there are problems in the Baltics. Second, it will have to face the extraordinary foreign policy divide in Europe. Those countries close to the buffers are extremely uneasy. Those farther away — Spain, for instance — are far calmer. Europe is not united, and Germany needs a united Europe. The shape of Europe will be determined in part by Germany’s response.

The second question is that of the United States. I have spoken of the strategy of balance of power. A balance of power strategy calls for calibration of involvement, not disengagement. Having chosen to support the creation of an anti-Russian regime in Ukraine, the United States now faces consequences and decisions. The issue is not deployments of major forces but providing the Central Europeans from Poland to Romania with the technology and materiel to discourage Russia from dangerous adventures — and to convince their publics that they are not alone.

The paradox is this: As the sphere of Western influence has moved to the east along Russia’s southern frontier, the actual line of demarcation has moved westward. Whatever happens within the buffer states, this line is critical for U.S. strategy because it maintains the European balance of power. We might call this soft containment.

It is far-fetched to think that the Russians would move beyond commercial activity in this region. It is equally far-fetched that EU or NATO expansion into Ukraine would threaten Russian national security. Yet history is filled with far-fetched occurrences that in retrospect are obvious. The Russians have less room to maneuver but everything at stake. They might therefore take risks that others, not feeling the pressure the Russians feel, would avoid. Again, it is a question of planning for the worst and hoping for the best.

For the United States, creating a regional balance of power is critical. Ideally, the Germans would join the project, but Germany is closer to Russia, and the plan involves risks Berlin will likely want to avoid. There is a grouping in the region called the Visegrad battlegroup. It is within the framework of NATO and consists of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. It is now more a concept than a military. However, with U.S. commitment and the inclusion of Romania, it could become a low-cost (to the United States) balance to a Russia suddenly feeling insecure and therefore unpredictable. This, and countering Russian commercial imperialism with a U.S. alternative at a time when Europe is hardly in a position to sustain the economies in these countries, would be logical.

This has been the U.S. strategy since 1939: maximum military and economic aid with minimal military involvement. The Cold War ended far better than the wars the Americans became directly involved in. The Cold War in Europe never turned hot. Logic has it that at some point the United States will adopt this strategy. But of course, in the meantime, we wait for Russia’s next move, or should none come, a very different Russia.

 

Share Ukraine’s Increasing Polarization and the Western Challenge.

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Just days before the Ukrainian crisis broke out, I took an overnight train to Kiev from Sevastopol in Crimea. Three mechanics in their 30s on their way to jobs in Estonia shared my compartment. All ethnic Russians born and raised in Sevastopol, they have made the trip to the Baltic states for the past eight years for seasonal work at Baltic Sea shipyards. Our ride together, accompanied by obligatory rounds of vodka, presented the opportunity for an in-depth discussion of Ukraine’s political crisis. The ensuing conversation was perhaps more enlightening than talks of similar length with Ukrainian political, economic or security officials.

My fellow passengers viewed the events at Independence Square in an overwhelmingly negative light. They considered the protesters camped out in Kiev’s central square terrorists, completely organized and financed by the United States and the European Union. They did not see the protesters as their fellow countrymen, and they supported then-President Viktor Yanukovich’s use of the Berkut security forces to crack down on them. In fact, they were shocked by the Berkut’s restraint, saying if it had been up to them, the protests would have been “cleaned up” from the outset. They added that while they usually looked forward to stopping over in Kiev during the long journey to the Baltics, this time they were ashamed of what was happening there and didn’t even want to set foot in the city. They also predicted that the situation in Ukraine would worsen before it improved.

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A few days later, the protests in Independence Square in fact reached a crescendo of violence. The Berkut closed in on the demonstrators, and subsequent clashes between protesters and security forces throughout the week left dozens dead and hundreds injured. This spawned a sequence of events that led to the overthrow of Yanukovich, the formation of a new Ukrainian government not recognized by Moscow and the subsequent Russian military intervention in Crimea. While the speed of these events astonished many foreign (especially Western) observers, to the men I met on the train, it was all but expected.

After all, the crisis didn’t emerge from a vacuum. Ukraine was a polarized country well before the EuroMaidan movement took shape. I have always been struck by how traveling to different parts of Ukraine feels like visiting different countries. Every country has its regional differences, to be sure. But Ukraine stands apart in this regard.

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Ukraine’s East-West Divide

Traveling in Lviv in the west, for example, is a starkly different experience than traveling in Donetsk in the east. The language spoken is different, with Ukrainian used in Lviv and Russian in Donetsk. The architecture is different, too, with classical European architecture lining narrow cobblestoned streets in Lviv and Soviet apartment blocs alongside sprawling boulevards predominating in Donetsk. Each region has different heroes: A large bust of Lenin surveys the main square in Donetsk, while Stepan Bandera, a World War II-era Ukrainian nationalist revolutionary, is honored in Lviv. Citizens of Lviv commonly view people from Donetsk as pro-Russian rubes while people in Donetsk constantly speak of nationalists/fascists in Lviv.

Lviv and Donetsk lie on the extreme ends of the spectrum, but they are hardly alone. Views are even more polarized on the Crimean Peninsula, where ethnic Russians make up the majority and which soon could cease to be part of Ukraine.

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The east-west Ukrainian cultural divide is deep, and unsurprisingly it is reflected in the country’s politics. Election results from the past 10 years show a clear dividing line between voting patterns in western and central Ukraine and those in the southern and eastern parts of the country. In the 2005 and 2010 presidential elections, Yanukovich received overwhelming support in the east and Crimea but only marginal support in the west. Ukraine does not have “swing states.”

Such internal political and cultural divisions would be difficult to overcome under normal circumstances, but Ukraine’s geographic and geopolitical position magnifies them exponentially. Ukraine is the quintessential borderland country, eternally trapped between Europe to the west and Russia to the east. Given its strategic location in the middle of the Eurasian heartland, the country has constantly been — and will constantly be — an arena in which the West and Russia duel for influence.

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Competition over Ukraine has had two primary effects on the country. The first is to further polarize Ukraine, splitting foreign policy preferences alongside existing cultural divisions. While many in western Ukraine seek closer ties with Europe, many in eastern Ukraine seek closer ties with Russia. While there are those who would avoid foreign entanglements altogether, both the European Union and Russia have made clear that neutrality is not an option. Outside competition in Ukraine has created wild and often destabilizing political swings, especially during the country’s post-Soviet independence.

Therefore, the current crisis in Ukraine is only the latest manifestation of competition between the West and Russia. The European Union and the United States greatly influenced the 2004 Orange Revolution in terms of financing and political organization. Russia meanwhile greatly influenced the discrediting of the Orange Regime and the subsequent election of Yanukovich, who lost in the Orange Revolution, in 2010. The West pushed back once more by supporting the EuroMaidan movement after Yanukovich abandoned key EU integration deals, and then Russia countered in Crimea, leading to the current impasse.

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The tug of war between Russia and the West over Ukraine has gradually intensified over the past decade. This has hardened positions in Ukraine, culminating in the formation of armed groups representing rival political interests and leading to the violent standoff in Independence Square that quickly spread to other parts of the country.

The current government enjoys Western support, but Moscow and many in eastern and southern Ukraine deny its legitimacy, citing the manner in which it took power. This sets a dangerous precedent because it challenges the sitting government’s and any future government’s ability to claim any semblance of nationwide legitimacy.

It is clear that Ukraine cannot continue to function for long in its current form. A strong leader in such a polarized society will face major unrest, as Yanukovich’s ouster shows. The lack of a national consensus will paralyze the government and prevent officials from forming coherent foreign policy, since any government that strikes a major deal with either Russia or the European Union will find it difficult to rightfully claim it speaks for the majority of the country. Now that Russia has used military moves in Crimea to show it will not let Ukraine go without a fight, the stage has been set for very difficult political negotiations over Ukraine’s future.

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Russian-Western Conflict Beyond Ukraine

A second, more worrying effect of the competition between the West and Russia over Ukraine extends beyond Ukrainian borders. As competition over the fate of Ukraine has escalated, it has also intensified Western-Russian competition elsewhere in the region.

Georgia and Moldova, two former Soviet countries that have sought stronger ties with the West, have accelerated their attempts to further integrate with the European Union — and in Georgia’s case, with NATO. On the other hand, countries such as Belarus and Armenia have sought to strengthen their economic and security ties with Russia. Countries already strongly integrated with the West like the Baltics are glad to see Western powers stand up to Russia, but meanwhile they know that they could be the next in line in the struggle between Russia and the West. Russia could hit them economically, and Moscow could also offer what it calls protection to their sizable Russian minorities as it did in Crimea. Russia already has hinted at this in discussions to extend Russian citizenship to ethnic Russians and Russian speakers throughout the former Soviet Union.

The major question moving forward is how committed Russia and the West are to backing and reinforcing their positions in these rival blocs. Russia has made clear that it is willing to act militarily to defend its interests in Ukraine. Russia showed the same level of dedication to preventing Georgia from turning to NATO in 2008. Moscow has made no secret that it is willing to use a mixture of economic pressure, energy manipulation and, if need be, military force to prevent the countries on its periphery from leaving the Russian orbit. In the meantime, Russia will seek to intensify integration efforts in its own blocs, including the Customs Union on the economic side and the Collective Security Treaty Organization on the military side.

So the big question is what the West intends. On several occasions, the European Union and United States have proved that they can play a major role in shaping events on the ground in Ukraine. Obtaining EU membership is a stated goal of the governments in Moldova and Georgia, and a significant number of people in Ukraine also support EU membership. But since it has yet to offer sufficient aid or actual membership, the European Union has not demonstrated as serious a commitment to the borderland countries as Russia has. It has refrained from doing so for several reasons, including its own financial troubles and political divisions and its dependence on energy and trade with Russia. While the European Union may yet show stronger resolve as a result of the current Ukrainian crisis, a major shift in the bloc’s approach is unlikely — at least not on its own.

On the Western side, then, U.S. intentions are key. In recent years, the United States has largely stayed on the sidelines in the competition over the Russian periphery. The United States was just as quiet as the European Union was in its reaction to the Russian invasion of Georgia, and calls leading up to the invasion for swiftly integrating Ukraine and Georgia into NATO went largely unanswered. Statements were made, but little was done.

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But the global geopolitical climate has changed significantly since 2008. The United States is out of Iraq and is swiftly drawing down its forces in Afghanistan. Washington is now acting more indirectly in the Middle East, using a balance-of-power approach to pursue its interests in the region. This frees up its foreign policy attention, which is significant, given that the United States is the only party with the ability and resources to make a serious push in the Russian periphery.

As the Ukraine crisis moves into the diplomatic realm, a major test of U.S. willingness and ability to truly stand up to Russia is emerging. Certainly, Washington has been quite vocal during the current Ukrainian crisis and has shown signs of getting further involved elsewhere in the region, such as in Poland and the Baltic states. But concrete action from the United States with sufficient backing from the Europeans will be the true test of how committed the West is to standing up to Moscow. Maneuvering around Ukraine’s deep divisions and Russian countermoves will be no easy task. But nothing short of concerted efforts by a united Western front will suffice to pull Ukraine and the rest of the borderlands toward the West.

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A different kind of opinion: Ukrainians in Estonia vision of what is happening in Ukraine.

I’m sorry, Googe translation !

The conflict in Ukraine has unleashed a massive flood of news and views , which are very difficult to navigate . In order to form its opinion , it would be good to explore different points of view and opinions expressed in them to accept, as well as those that are against the grain . And not only in Africa , Europe , the EU , U.S. and Russian official positions but also visions of ordinary people . Today we offer you to read one of the Ukrainians in Estonia , Alexander Gilenko opinion. Alexander was born in Tallinn , and his mother is from Western Ukraine and Eastern Ukraine ‘s father .

Information war is going on in Ukraine into its hottest phase. Even those who had not done any political posts , now take the word on Facebook and write something in Ukraine . For those who already know everything anyway , and all can understand , that’s not the point to be considered . For them , the world is divided into black and white , and uncomfortable questions do not make sense. This issue , however, needs a bit of independent thinking .

First of all, talking about what constitutes today’s Ukraine

Ukraine is a big country , but it took its present shape only during the Soviet era , the 1950s . The current Ukrainian territory are also those parts that were previously associated in any way with Ukraine : for example Zakarpatskaja region ( Trans-Carpathia ) . Before the Second World War , it was part of Czechoslovakia . After the war, Stalin joined the Soviet Union and the ” gifted ” in Ukraine. Due to this fact, the Federal Council of the border with Hungary .

Secondly, in the western part of Ukraine , Lvov and other cities were historically an ancestral territory of Poland , inhabited mostly Poles. Before the Second World War, was a Polish city of Lvov . This part of the country of Poland during World War II as well as adding to the Soviet Union, and it became part of Ukraine .

Third, the Crimea was also not in any way related to Ukraine . It was a peninsula of Crimea by the Russian Empire (Russian Empress Catherine II ) got a war with Turkey 18 century. Since then, however, the Crimea has always been a strategic part of Russia on the Black Sea. This was during World War II and later . If, however, the Soviet leader Khrushchev, the Ukrainian was , he gave in 1954. In Ukraine, the Crimea .

Fourth, eastern Ukraine , Luhansk and Donetsk Oblast , Don Cossacks were autonomous land , large parts of Russia , which had never been directly linked to the Ukrainians . There are a lot of Cossacks. Ruthenians and Hungarians living in Ukraine , southern and eastern Ukraine spoken mostly in Russian. Thus , culturally and historically has been a very mixed in modern Ukrainian state in the West ( which was before Poland) is Roman Catholicism , most of the people living there wants to integrate with the West , the East is the Orthodox Christian majority , and speaks Russian . Many of the people living in the south east, and working in Russia ( almost the same way as many Estonians working in Finland) . They are already very closely associated with Russia , and not just economically . Living in the Crimea Tatars , who are Muslims, and instead wants no part of the Russian Federation and the European Union to integrate , but would like to have more sovereignty. Thus , Ukraine is one of the modern state, as was once Yugoslavia : Ukraine is not a typical European nation state within the meaning of the last century . And every conflict in Ukraine may lead to a scenario of Yugoslavia . Now that it is interested in ? Russia ? Hardly.

What began in the latest conflict in Ukraine?

Voltage worsened from the time when the Ukrainian president Yanukovych is not a signatory to the association and a free trade agreement with the European Union . Why did he do it ? He had the option to choose whether Ukraine will be a customs union with Russia and Ukraine can be a partner with Belarus and Kazakhstan, who make up a common customs union , or the Ukraine signed an Association Agreement with the European Union . Purely economically would be a customs union with Russia (and others ) a lot more beneficial for Ukraine , because Ukraine’s products and services are exported mainly to Russia , Kazakhstan and Belarus. Ukraine is not Europe but the competitive products . Thus , by signing an Association Agreement with the EU , Ukraine would lose a large share of the Russian market and will not be able to afford anything .

The European Union , however, wants to be sure your getting the Ukraine , and this became the beginning of the conflict .

This conflict is necessary to look at the world of geopolitics in the context of

Russia, it is believed that they are near the partner of Ukraine . The U.S. and EU , however, want to Ukraine itself . Thus , there will be no freedom in Ukraine (as well as Ireland did not get it ) . In the long run, Russia , Ukraine may be either a partner or a close member of the European Union . Of course , the globalists want in Ukraine, because it is a large and resource -rich country . But even this is not the most important thing. The most important is that the globalists want to irritate Russia , Ukraine as well as the globalists themselves have actually historically part of Russia . Precisely because they want to take a large part of the historic Russian ( Ukrainian State ) itself. And they take advantage of all the currently topical problems to achieve their goal . The economic situation in the country is very difficult, power is corrupt and inefficient. It does not issue no-one less than in Ukraine or Russia. Yanukovych has led to the extremely poor state of the country , economic and other issues remain unresolved. The globalist ‘s primary purpose is to weaken Russia.

I remember that Russia was the only country that prevented the U.S. pommitamast Syria . War with Syria was basically decided at the last moment , and the question was being driven opposition to Russia after the holiday cottage . Syria does not grind him to powder bombed back to the Middle Ages ( as was done in Afghanistan, Iraq , Libya , etc. ) . Syria and Iran were on their plans and it became an obstacle to Russia’s war with these countries .

Thus , in my opinion, is taking place in Ukraine to Russia vengeance .

Currently living in Ukraine is much worse than in Russia , speak of the people who have lived recently in both countries , but it is confirmed by the statistics and economic indicators . So in Ukraine , things are very bad. U.S. uses people’s righteous anger in order to carry out a violent coup d’etat . Unfortunately, ordinary people can not Maidanil whose behalf they fought . People are fighting for freedom , desiring liberty to corrupt politicians. It is natural and understandable. However, there will be no freedom . People are waiting for ” unpopular reforms ” , ” austerity policies ” and the EU directives , in principle, the Greek scenario .

Now, let’s look at what were the power of the first decisions of the new Maidan . They canceled the regional languages ​​of the Act ( in a multicultural country like Ukraine) , which enabled to use the official language in Ukraine , but also Hungarian, Russian, Polish and Romanian languages. Second , they destroyed all the nationwide death toll in World War II monuments and even took off the pillar Kutuzov (who won the war against Napoleon in the 19th century ) . And who was the Prime Minister of the place ? Jatsenjuk . Who is he ? Jatsenjuk is a puppet who goes once a week for consultations in Brussels and Berlin . He has promised to give Ukraine globalistidele .

Every revolution ends the same way

People are fighting for freedom , but eventually someone will take power for themselves , and people are allowed without . So what happened during the French Revolution , the Russian Revolution, as well as the recent Egyptian revolution is .

What does Russia now ? It is clear that Russia is irritated. Russia sees Ukraine as historically, his brother , or a “family member ” , which is great for them an integral part of the Russian world . Crimea is Russian military bases in the Black Sea Fleet , and much more. Moscow , it’s all a dirty game against Russia , and it protects your interests. A large part of Ukraine is not in favor of this revolution in the Maidan . Since the U.S. already publicly playing his great game in Ukraine , the Russian Federation has decided to take over control of the Crimean least . It aims to consolidate its position on the peninsula , and to avoid any unpleasant surprise of a new power in the Maidan , the latter has been shown many times that the agreements are not respected .

Now back to Estonia

Yesterday was IRL organized a demonstration in front of the Russian embassy . There were some Estonian politicians , which was pretty stupid of them . Estonia has constantly been used to irritate the Russian bear . Estonia, while it is not useful at all , unlike the U.S., which it is very useful. They make use of Russia’s neighbors (Estonia , Latvia , Lithuania , and now Ukraine) to irritate Russia and provoke the action. Finally , when Russia responds , then they say , “Well , you see, we told you that Russia is a very dangerous, very evil and very wild. ” But the reality is very foolish and unreasonable to irritate the bear . He’ll have to be more careful and friendly .

In this sense, we would need to take the example of Finland. Finnish – Russian relations were very heavy. There was even a war. But, eventually came to power in Washington , and his policy of neutrality . Finland has received a lot of benefits that are consistently avoided the Russian bear agitation, Russia tried to be a good neighbor and trading partner , and to maintain neutrality . I really care about Estonia and, in my opinion, this is a good example for Estonia .

We saw it rally ? Feel Kelam , who was in Parliament on Iran and Syria bombing plan a big supporter of the U.S. . Kelam do not care about world peace , but the globalist agenda fulfillment . Now, we saw him demonstration . That he is not in favor of a large Russian forces in the Crimea , but are against it. But as an independent state in the U.S. to Iran , the second major bombing raids freely . Naturally …

What happens now?

In my opinion, the Crimean Peninsula, to decide the future of the people who live there . This requires that a referendum in which the Crimean residents have the opportunity to decide whether they will continue with the Ukraine or the Crimea goes back to the Russian Federation or the staff there will be a new independent state on the world map instead . Taking into account the Kosovo precedent , Estonia should favor such a referendum and agree with the result , whatever it may be.

Alexander Gilenko

Konflikt Ukrainas on vallandanud massilise uudiste- ja arvamustetulva, kus on väga raske orienteeruda. Et oma seisukohta kujundada, oleks hea tutvuda erinevate vaatenurkade ja arvamustega, nii nendega, millega nõustud, kui ka nendega, mis on vastukarva.  Ja mitte ainult Eesti, Euroopa-Liidu, USA ja Vene ametlike seisukohtade vaid ka tavainimeste nägemustega. Täna pakume teile lugemiseks ühe Eesti ukrainlase, Aleksander Gilenko arvamust. Aleksander on sündinud Tallinnas ning tema ema on pärit Lääne-Ukrainast ja isa Ida-Ukrainast.

Infosõda Ukraina ümber toimuva kohta on oma kõige kuumemas faasis. Isegi need, kes varem ei teinud ühtegi poliitilist postitust, võtavad nüüd sõna ja kirjutavad Facebookis midagi Ukrainast. Neil, kes juba niikuinii kõike teavad ja kõigest aru saavad, polegi mõtet edasi lugeda. Nende jaoks on maailm mustvalgeks jagatud ja ebamugavaid küsimusi esitada pole mõtet. See teema vajab aga natuke iseseisvat mõtlemist.

 

Kõigepealt räägime sellest, mida kujutab endast tänapäeva Ukraina

Ukraina on suur riik, aga oma praeguse kuju võttis ta alles Nõukogude ajal, 1950-ndatel aastatel. Praeguse Ukraina territooriumil asuvad ka sellised osad, mis enne ei olnud Ukrainaga kuidagi seotud: näiteks Zakarpatskaja oblast (Taga-Karpaatia). Enne Teist maailmasõda oli see Tšehhoslovakkia osa. Pärast sõda liitis Stalin selle Nõukogude Liiduga ja “kinkis“ Ukrainale. Tänu sellele sai Nõukogu Liit piiri Ungariga.

Teiseks, Ukraina lääneosa, Lvov ja muud linnad olid ajalooliselt igipõline Poola territoorium, kus elasid enamuses poolakad. Enne Teist maailmasõda oli Lvov Poola linn. See osa Poola riigist liideti Teise maailmasõja käigus samuti Nõukogude Liiduga ja sellest sai Ukraina osa.

Kolmandaks, Krimm ei olnud samuti kuidagi Ukrainaga seotud. Krimm oli see poolsaar, mille Vene impeerium (Vene keisrinna Katariina II) sai endale sõjas Türgiga 18. sajandil. Sellest ajast peale on Krimm aga olnud alati strateegiline osa Venemaast Mustal merel. Nii oli Teise maailmasõja käigus ja ka hiljem. Kui aga Nõukogude Liidu liidriks sai ukrainlane Hruštšov, kinkis ta 1954. aastal Krimmi Ukrainale.

Neljandaks, Ukraina idaosa, Luganski ja Donetski oblast, olid Doni kasakate autonoomsed maad, suure Venemaa osad, mis ei olnud kunagi otseselt ukrainlastega seotud. Seal on palju kasakaid. Ukrainas elavad russiinid ja ungarlased, Lõuna- ja Ida-Ukrainas räägitakse enamjaolt vene keelt. Seega, kultuuriliselt ja ajalooliselt on tänapäeva Ukraina väga kirju riik, läänes (kus enne oli Poola) on katoliiklus, enamus seal elavatest tahab läänega integreeruda; idas on õigeusk ja enamus räägib vene keelt. Paljud idas ja lõunas elavatest inimestest töötavad Venemaal (peaaegu samamoodi, nagu paljud eestlased töötavad Soomes). Nad on juba praegu Venemaaga väga tihedalt seotud ja mitte ainult majanduslikult. Krimmis elavad ka tatarlased, kes on hoopis moslemid ja taha sugugi ei Venemaaga ega Euroopa Liiduga integreeruda, vaid soovivad endale rohkem suveräänsust. Seega, tänapäevane Ukraina on selline segariik, nagu kunagi oli Jugoslaavia: Ukraina ei ole tüüpiline Euroopa rahvusriik eelmise sajandi mõistes. Ja iga konflikt Ukrainas võib viia Jugoslaavia stsenaariumini. Nüüd, kes on sellest huvitatud? Venemaa? Vaevalt.

 

Millest sai alguse see viimane konflikt Ukrainas?

Pinge süvenes sellest hetkest, kui Ukraina president Janukovõtš ei kirjutanud alla assotsiatsiooni- ja vabakaubandusleppele Euroopa Liiduga. Miks ta seda siis ei teinud? Tal oli võimalus valida, kas Ukraina saab tolliliidu Venemaaga ja Ukrainast saab koostööpartner koos Valgevenega ja Kasahstaniga, kes moodustavad ühise tolliliidu, või Ukraina kirjutab alla assotsiatsioonilepingu Euroopa Liiduga. Puhtalt majanduslikult oleks tolliliit Venemaaga (ja teistega) Ukrainale palju kasulikum, sest Ukraina tooted ja teenused eksporditakse peamiselt just Venemaale, Kasahstani ja Valgevenesse. Euroopas ei ole Ukraina tooted aga konkurentsivõimelised. Seega, kirjutades alla assotsiatsioonilepingu EL-iga, kaotaks Ukraina suure osa Venemaa turust ja ei saaks endale midagi.

Euroopa Liit aga tahab kindlasti Ukrainat endale saada ja sellest saigi konflikt alguse.

 

Seda konflikti on vaja vaadata maailma geopoliitika kontekstis

Venemaal arvatakse, et Ukraina on nende lähipartner. USA ja EL aga tahavad Ukrainat endale. Seega, mingisugust vabadust Ukrainas ei tule (nagu ei saanud seda ka Eesti). Pikemas perspektiivis võib Ukraina olla kas Venemaa lähipartner või Euroopa Liidu liige. Loomulikult, globalistid tahavad Ukrainat, sest see on suur ja ressurssiderikas riik. Aga isegi see ei ole kõige tähtsam. Tähtsaim on see, et globalistid tahavad ärritada Venemaad, sest ka globalistid ise peavad Ukrainat tegelikult ajalooliselt Venemaa osaks. Just nimelt seetõttu tahavad nad võtta ajalooliselt Venemaa suure osa (Ukraina riigi) endale. Ja nad kasutavad ära kõiki praegu aktuaalseid probleeme, et oma eesmärki saavutada. Majanduslik olukord riigis on väga raske, võim on korrumpeerunud ja ebaefektiivne. Seda ei sea vaidluse alla keegi ei Ukrainas ega Venemaal. Janukovõtš on viinud riigi väga viletsasse seisu, majanduslikud ja muud küsimused on jäänud lahendamata. Globalistide esmane eesmärk on nõrgestada Venemaad.

Mäletagem, et Venemaa oli ainus riik, kes takistas USA-d Süüriat pommitamast. Sõda Süüriaga oli põhimõtteliselt otsustatud küsimus ja viimasel hetkel jäi sõida vaid vastuseisu pärast Venemaaga puhkemata. Süüriat ei pommitatud pihuks ja põrmuks tagasi keskaega (nagu seda tehti Afganistanis, Iraagis, Liibüas jne). Süüria ja Iraan olid nende plaanis sees ja just Venemaa sai takistuseks nendes riikides sõja alustamisel.

Seega, minu arvates on Ukrainas toimuv kättemaks Venemaale.

Praegu on elu Ukrainas palju halvem kui Venemaal, sellest räägivad inimesed, kes on elanud viimasel ajal mõlemas riigis, aga seda kinnitab ka statistika ja majanduslikud näitajad. Nii et Ukrainas on asjad väga halvasti. USA kasutas inimeste õiglast viha selleks, et viia läbi vägivaldne riigipööre. Kahjuks lihtinimesed Maidanil ei saa seda, mille nimel nad võitlesid. Inimesed võitlesid vabaduse eest, tahtes priiust korrumpeerunud poliitikutest. See on loomulik ja arusaadav. Mingisugust vabadust aga ei tule. Inimesi ootavad “ebapopulaarsed reformid“, “range kokkuhoiupoliitika“ ja EL-i direktiivid, põhimõtteliselt Kreeka stsenaariumi järgi.

Nüüd aga vaadakem, millised olid uue Maidani võimu esimesed otsused. Nad tühistasid regionaalkeelte seaduse (sellises multikultuurses riigis nagu Ukraina), mis võimaldas ametlikult kasutada ukraina keele kõrval ka ungari, vene, poola ja rumeenia keeli. Teiseks, nad hävitasid üleriigiliselt kõik Teises maailmasõjas hukkunute ausambad ning võtsid maha isegi Kutuzovi samba (kes 19. sajandil võitis sõja Napoleoni vastu). Ja kes sai peaministri koha? Jatsenjuk. Kes ta on? Jatsenjuk on marionett, kes käib kord nädalas Brüsselis ja Berliinis konsultatsioonides. Ta on lubanud Ukraina globalistidele anda.

 

Iga revolutsioon lõpeb ühtemoodi

Inimesed võitlevad vabaduse eest, aga lõpuks keegi võtab võimu endale ja inimesed jäävad lubatust ilma. Nii juhtus Prantsuse revolutsiooni käigus, Vene revolutsiooni käigus ja samuti hiljutise Egiptuse revolutsiooni tulemusena.

Mida nüüd teeb Venemaa? Selge, et Venemaa on ärritunud. Venemaa näeb Ukrainat ajalooliselt oma venna või “perekonnaliikmena“, mis on nende jaoks suure vene maailma lahutamatu osa. Krimmis on Vene sõjaväebaasid, Musta mere laevastik ja palju muud. Moskva jaoks on see kõik räpane mäng Venemaa vastu ja ta kaitseb oma huve. Suur osa Ukrainast ei poolda seda Maidani revolutsiooni. Kuna USA juba avalikult mängib oma suurt mängu Ukrainas, siis Venemaa otsustas võtta vähemalt Krimmi enda kontrolli alla. Sellega tahetakse kindlustada oma positsiooni poolsaarel ja vältida igasugust ebameeldivat üllatust uue Maidani võimu poolt, kuna viimane on juba mitu korda näidanud, et kokkulepetest kinni ei peeta.

 

Nüüd tagasi Eestisse

Eile toimus IRL-i korraldatud meeleavaldus Vene saatkonna ees. Kohal olid mõned Eesti poliitikud, mis oli nendest üsna rumal. Eestit on pidevalt ära kasutatud, et ärritada vene karu. Kusjuures Eesti jaoks ei ole see üldse kasulik, vastupidiselt USA-le, kellele see on väga kasulik. Nad kasutavad Venemaa naabreid (Eesti, Läti, Leedu ja nüüd ka Ukraina), et ärritada Venemaad ja provotseerida vastutegevusele. Lõpuks, kui Venemaa reageerib, siis öeldakse: “No, näete, me ju rääkisime teile, et Venemaa on väga ohtlik, väga kuri ja väga metsik.“ Aga tegelikult on väga rumal ja ebamõistlik ärritada karu. Temaga tuleb pigem olla sõbralik ja ettevaatlik.

Selles mõttes oleks meil vaja võtta eeskuju Soomest. Soome-Venemaa suhted olid väga rasked. Oli isegi sõda. Aga lõpuks tuli võimule Kekkonen ja tema neutraalsuse poliitika. Soome on saanud väga palju kasu sellest, et on pidevalt vältinud vene karu ärritamist, üritanud olla Venemaale hea kaubanduspartner ja naaber ning säilitanud neutraalsuse. Ma väga hoolin Eestist ja minu meelest on see Eesti jaoks heaks eeskujuks.

Keda me nägime seal meeleavaldusel? Tunne Kelamit, kes oli Euroopa Parlamendis Iraani ja Süüria pommitamise plaanis USA suur toetaja. Kelam ei hooli maailma rahust, vaid globalistide agenda täitmisest. Nüüd nägime teda meeleavaldusel. Et ta ei poolda suure Venemaa vägede sisseviimist Krimmi, vaid on selle vastu. Aga samuti iseseisvat Iraani võib teine suurriik USA vabalt pommitada. Loomulikult…

 

Mis nüüd edasi saab?

Minu arvates peavad Krimmi poolsaare tuleviku otsustama need inimesed, kes seal elavad. Selleks peab referendumi korraldama, kus Krimmi elanikel on võimalus otsustada, kas nad jätkavad koos Ukrainaga või Krimm läheb tagasi Venemaa Föderatsiooni koosseisu või tekib maailmakaardile hoopis uus iseseisev riik. Võttes arvesse Kosovo pretsedenti, peaks Eesti sellist referendumit pooldama ja nõustuma selle tulemusega, milline iganes see ka poleks.

 

Aleksander Gilenko

The situation in Ukraine. Chronicle of events. on March 6 International Panorama.

Ситуация на Украине. Хроника событий. 6 марта

6 марта, 20:32 дата обновления: 6 марта, 20:33 UTC+4
Евросоюз опубликовал санкционный список украинских чиновников. В списке 18 человек, в том числе Виктор Янукович и его сыновья

 

ИТАР-ТАСС/Матыцин Валерий

 

ЕС проведет экстренный саммит по Украине. Главы МИД стран Запада и РФ не смогли договориться о создании контактной группы по Украине

 

20.27 мск Горсовет Севастополя постановил провести 16 марта референдум по вхождению города в состав РФ.

 

20.19 мск В случае присоединения к Крыма к России автономия войдет в рублевую зону, заявил первый вице-премьер Крыма Рустам Темиргалиев.

 

20.05 мск Арсений Яценюк пригласил Совет НАТО на уровне послов провести заседание в Киеве. “Я считаю, что нам нужно расширить наше сотрудничество. Было бы хорошо также получить техническую помощь для улучшения военных возможностей Украины. Это значительно помогло бы нам повысить наши оборонные возможности и поддерживать стабильность в регионе”, – сказал он.

 

В свою очередь, генсек НАТО Андерс Фог Расмуссен приветствовал “сдержанность украинской армии перед лицом серьезного давления”. “Хладнокровие – это путь к снижению напряжения”, – заявил он.

 

 

 

20.01 мск Генпрокуратура Украины возбудила против Виктора Януковича уголовное дело по обвинению в захвате государственной власти в 2010 году. Прокуратура утверждает, что Янукович “неконституционным способом изменил конституцию Украины и тем самым захватил государственную власть”.

 

19.57 мск Украина не рассматривает вопрос вступления в НАТО, заявил утвержденный Верховной радой главой временного правительства Украины Арсений Яценюк.

 

19.54 мск Арсений Яценюк заверил генсека НАТО в том, что Киев рассматривает только мирные пути выхода из кризиса.

 

19:36 мск По данным МВД Украины, за два дня кампании по разоружению населения сдано около 70 единиц оружия.

 

19.28 мск Президент РФ не входит в санкционный список Вашингтона, заявил представитель администрации США.

 

19.08 мск Губернатор Донецкой области Сергей Тарута заявил о постепенной “нормализации ситуации в центре Донецка”. Правоохранительные органы вытеснили митингующих из здания администрации. При этом около 70 человек были задержаны. В настоящее время здесь находится большое количество силовиков, жителей к зданию не подпускают.

 

Около сотни протестующих вновь пришли к администрации, предполагая, что митинг будет возобновлен. Сотрудники милиции задержали двух человек, которые призывали присутствующих в очередной раз занять здание администрации.

 

19.03 мск В Донецке задержан “народный губернатор” области Павел Губарев. Об этом сообщили в Службе безопасности Украины.

 

У США нет и не может быть морального права на нравоучения по поводу соблюдения международных норм и уважения суверенитета других стран… Россию смеют упрекать в “вооруженной агрессии”, когда она вступается за своих соотечественников, составляющих большинство населения Крыма, чтобы не дать ультранационалистическим силам устроить еще один кровавый “майдан” Александр Лукашевич официальный представитель МИД РФ

 

18.54 мск Как заявили в МИД РФ, госдеп США пытается сыграть на бессовестно однобокой трактовке событий на Украине, игнорируя многочисленные свидетельства бесчинств радикал-националистов, включая провокационные убийства снайперами.

 

18.53 мск Утвержденный Верховной радой главой временного правительства Украины Арсений Яценюк высказался за выстраивание нового типа отношений между Украиной и Россией. “Мы готовы к сотрудничеству, но не готовы сдаваться и быть в подчинении у России”, – сказал он.

 

18.51 мск Администрация США рассматривает вопрос о внесении новых имен российских чиновников в так называемый список Магнитского. Об этом на слушаниях в палате представителей Конгресса,посвященных ситуации на Украине, сообщил заместитель помощника госсекретаря Эрик Рубин.

 

18.45 мск Украинские пограничные службы препятствуют свободному пересечению границы гражданами России, сообщили в МИД РФ.

 

18.43 мск Военные наблюдатели ОБСЕ будут дожидаться в Херсоне разрешения на посещение Крыма, заявил представитель организации.

 

18.18 мск Переходное правительство Украины “не намерено прибегать к военной силе в конфликте в Крыму, если страна не подвергнется прямому иностранному вторжению”, заявил утвержденный Верховной радой главой временного правительства Украины Арсений Яценюк. По его утверждению, Киев рассматривает происходящее в Крыму как прямую “российскую военную агрессию”.

 

18.17 мск Инфляция на Украине в феврале ускорилась до 0,6%.

 

18.15 мск Председатель Совета Федерации Валентина Матвиенко 7 марта проведет встречу с делегацией Верховного совета Крыма, сообщили в пресс-службе Совфеда.

 

18.14 мск Филиал МГУ в Севастополе работает спокойно, без срывов занятий, сообщил Виктор Садовничий

 

Мы призываем Россию не признавать так называемое правительство Крыма Арсений Яценюк утвержденный Верховной радой премьер-министром страны

 

18.02 мск Крым останется неотъемлемой частью Украины, считает утвержденный Верховной радой премьер-министром страны Арсений Яценюк на пресс-конференции после встречи с Брюсселе с лидерами 28 стран ЕС, собравшимися на экстренный саммит по Украине.

 

18.02 мск ВЭБ не собирается продавать украинский Проминвестбанк, никаких убытков на Украине банк пока не несет, заявил глава Внешэкономбанка Владимир Дмитриев.

 

18.00 мск Курс доллара США к украинской гривне по итогам торгов на межбанковском рынке Украины в четверг снизился на 1,6% по сравнению с уровнем закрытия среды и составил 9,25 гривны за доллар.

 

17.58 мск По словам министра иностранных дел России Сергея Лаврова, госсекретарь США Джон Керри заверил, что пока никаких списков по визовым санкциям.

 

 

 

17.55 мск В Госдуме представили юридические аргументы легитимности референдума в Крыму. По словам члена комитета Госдумы по делам СНГ Василия Лихачева, право Крыма на изменение статуса базируется на двух принципах. “Первый принцип – это право народа на самоопределение”, – подчеркнул парламентарий. Второй юридический аргумент легитимности предстоящего референдума “связан с тем, что международное публичное право и соответствующие международные документы, включая Устав ООН, заключительный акт Хельсинкского совещания по вопросам безопасности и сотрудничеству 1975 года, говорят о политических правах населения, конкретного человека – на деятельность, на волеизъявление по политическому спектру”, продолжил Лихачев.

 

17.54 мск Намерения США ввести санкции против РФ – это уже угроза, заявил глава МИД России Сергей Лавров.

 

17.53 мск Все предприятия, расположенные на территории Крыма и которые находятся в государственной собственности Украины, будут национализированы, заявил первый вице-премьер автономной республики Рустам Темиргалиев. При этом он заметил, что вся собственность частного бизнеса, включая землю, недвижимость, предприятия, будет переоформлена в соответствии с российским законодательством.

 

 

 

17.52 мск В Одессе лидеры общественных организаций сформировали “штаб протестных сил”, чтобы совместными усилиями добиваться децентрализации власти на Украине. С инициативой о его формировании выступил на завершившемся сегодня митинге перед областной администрацией депутат Верховной рады Украины Игорь Марков, который прилетел в четверг в Одессу из Москвы.

 

17.44 мск Депутаты Госдумы 7 марта встретятся с делегацией Верховного совета Крыма, сообщили в думском Управлении по связям с общественностью и взаимодействию со СМИ.

 

17.40 мск Глава МИД РФ Сергей Лавров и госсекретарь США Джон Керри провели в Риме двустороннюю встречу, в ходе которой обсудили ситуацию на Украине.

 

17.27 мск Военных наблюдателей из стран Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе не допустили на территорию Крыма. “Наблюдателей развернули на контрольном пункте по пути из Одессы в Крым”, – сказал представитель ОБСЕ.

 

16:51 мск Минфин Украины пока не рассматривает вопрос реструктуризации платежей. Обслуживание и погашение государственного долга Украины “осуществляется в установленные сроки в полном объеме”, заявили в ведомстве.

 

 

 

16.43 мск Президент США Барак Обама распорядился ввести санкции в отношении лиц и организаций, подрывающих демократические институты на Украине.

 

16.29 мск Заместителей министра обороны Украины уволили за отказ придать “Правому сектору” статус регулярных военизированных подразделений. Такое распоряжение подписал назначенный Верховной радой премьер-министром Украины Арсений Яценюк, сообщил источник в правительстве страны. “Яценюк освободил от должности первого замминистра обороны Украины Александра Олейника, Владимира Можаровского и Артуро Франциско Бабенко”, – сказал источник.

 

16.18 мск Украинский олигарх Сергей Курченко опроверг все обвинения со стороны ЕС в преступлениях, связанных с хищением государственных средств и их незаконным выводом с Украины. “Я удивлен, что попал в список лиц, относительно которых ЕС применил ограничительные меры. Но еще более я удивлен формулировкой “лицо, подлежащее расследованию за участие в преступлениях, связанных с хищением государственных средств и их незаконным выводом с Украины”. Я честный украинский бизнесмен, который всегда инвестировал в Украину, и именно здесь сосредоточен практически весь мой бизнес”, – заявил Курченко.

 

 

 

16.10 мск Вопрос выхода Автономной Республики Крым может решаться только на всеукраинском референдуме. Такое заявление сделал глава представительства ЕС на Украине Ян Томбинский.

 

16.07 мск Проверочная миссия Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе (ОБСЕ) планирует посетить Крым. Об этом сообщил журналистам директор департамента информационной политики МИД Украины Евгений Перебейнос. “Сегодня Верификационная миссия Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе планирует вылететь в Крым”, – сказал он.

 

14.12 мск Украине “необходимо привлечь около $13 млрд” кредитов для того, чтобы расплатиться с долгами. Такую оценку высказал назначенный Верховной радой министром экономического развития и торговли Павел Шеремет.

 

 

Инфографика Автономная Республика Крым

Автономная Республика Крым. Инфографика ИТАР-ТАСС

 

13.54 мск Верховный совет Крыма принял принципиальное решение о вступлении автономии в состав РФ.

 

13.26 мск Референдум о статусе Крыма пройдет 16 марта. Об этом ИТАР-ТАСС заявил первый вице-премьер Автономной Республики Крым Рустам Темиргалиев.

 

12.32 мск Вопрос о выдаче лидера “Правого сектора” Дмитрия Яроша будет рассматриваться в соответствии с украинским законодательством, и в связи с наличием у него гражданства Украины в экстрадиции будет отказано, сообщили в пресс-службе украинской генпрокуратуры.

 

12.29 мск Визит делегации Верховного совета Крыма во главе со спикером Владимиром Константиновым в Москву, который должен был начаться 6 марта, отложен.

 

11.51 мск Генеральная прокуратура Украины инкриминировала командующему Черноморским флотом России вице-адмиралу Александру Витко совершение преступлений на территории Автономной Республики Крым.

 

11.10 мск Милиция освободила здание Донецкой областной администрации; задержаны 70 человек. В милиции также подтвердили информацию местных СМИ о задержании “народного губернатора” Павла Губарева.

 

09.08 мск Евросоюз опубликовал санкционный список украинских чиновников. В списке 18 человек, среди которых Виктор Янукович, его сыновья, Николай Азаров и другие.

 

07.06 мск СБ ООН проведет четвертую за неделю встречу по Украине. На совещании будет уделено особое внимание инциденту, который произошел в Крыму со спецпредставителем ООН Робертом Серри.

 

05.06 мск Россия, США и Европа согласны с тем, что и кризис на Украине, и ситуация, сложившаяся из-за событий в этой стране, должны быть урегулированы путем диалога. Об этом заявил госсекретарь США Джон Керри после переговоров с министром иностранных дел России Сергеем Лавровым и главами МИДов ряда европейских государств.

 

04.53 мск США считают, что приезд в Крым наблюдателей от ООН или Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе (ОБСЕ) позволит найти выход из сложившейся на Украине ситуации.

 

04.34 мск Замгенсека ООН считает, что напряженность на границе Херсонской области и Крыма снизилась. Вместе с тем он констатировал, что ситуация в этом районе остается неопределенной и призвал все стороны проявить сдержанность.

 

04.26 мск МИД Балтии, Северных стран и Вышеградской группы обсудят политику ЕС и ситуацию на Украине. Мероприятие с участием руководителей внешнеполитических ведомств Латвии, Литвы, Эстонии, Дании, Исландии, Норвегии, Финляндии, Швеции, Венгрии, Польши, Словакии и Чехии продлится два дня.

 

04.23 мск Президент США Барак Обама и премьер-министр Великобритании Дэвид Кэмерон считают, что Россия уже начала платить цену за свои действия на Украине.

 

02.42 мск Госсекретарь США Джон Керри и ряд глав МИДов ЕС в беседе с министром иностранных дел России Сергеем Лавровым отказались “комментировать утечки” о телефонном разговоре верховного представителя Евросоюза по иностранным делам и политике безопасности Кэтрин Эштон с руководителем дипслужбы Эстонии Урмасом Паэтом. Об этом сообщил источник в российской делегации.

 

На аудиозаписи эстонский министр уверяет главу европейской дипслужбы в том, что за снайперами на Майдане “стоит не Янукович”.

 

02.06 мск ЕС проведет экстренный саммит по Украине. Участники встречи, в частности, рассмотрят возможность введения санкций в отношении России.

 

01.50 мск Главы МИД стран Запада и РФ не смогли договориться о создании контактной группы по Украине.

 

01.18 мск Александр Грушко: российская сторона разочарована итогами Совета Россия-НАТО. Ранее Североатлантический альянс приостановил проведение военных и гражданских встреч с РФ.

 

01.15 мск Госсекретарь США Джон Керри сообщил, что надеется продолжить обсуждение украинского кризиса на встрече с министром иностранных дел России Сергеем Лавровым в Риме.

 

01.14 мск Исполняющий обязанности генерального прокурора Украины Олег Махницкий сообщил, что установлены лица, расстрелявшие 2 марта под Киевом трех сотрудников госавтоинспекции. Между тем он не стал отрицать того факта, что преступники имеют отношение к беспорядкам в Киеве.

 

01.05 мск Россия убеждена, что НАТО может осложнить ситуацию на Украине, заявил постоянный представитель России при НАТО Александр Грушко.

 

00.41 мск Глава МИД Франции допускает, что выйти из кризиса на Украине можно уже в ближайшее время.

 

 

Ситуация на Украине. Хроника событий. 5 марта

Breaking: Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet and Catherine …

[fvplayer src=’http://kalevholland.planet.ee//wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Breaking-Estonian-Foreign-Minister-Urmas-Paet-and-Catherine-Ashton-discuss-Ukraine-over-the-phone.mp4′ width=320 height=240]

Ukraine and the ‘Little Cold War’ !

We must consider the future of Eurasia after the fall of the Soviet Union. Since 1991, the region has fragmented and decayed. The successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia, is emerging from this period with renewed self-confidence. Yet Russia is also in an untenable geopolitical position. Unless Russia exerts itself to create a sphere of influence, the Russian Federation could itself fragment.

For most of the second half of the 20th century, the Soviet Union controlled Eurasia — from central Germany to the Pacific, as far south as the Caucasus and the Hindu Kush. When the Soviet Union collapsed, its western frontier moved east nearly 1,000 miles, from the West German border to the Russian border with Belarus. Russian power has now retreated farther east than it has been in centuries. During the Cold War it had moved farther west than ever before. In the coming decades, Russian power will settle somewhere between those two lines.

After the Soviet Union dissolved at the end of the 20th century, foreign powers moved in to take advantage of Russia’s economy, creating an era of chaos and poverty. Most significantly, Ukraine moved into an alignment with the United States and away from Russia — this was a breaking point in Russian history.

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine, from December 2004 to January 2005, was the moment when the post-Cold War world genuinely ended for Russia. The Russians saw the events in Ukraine as an attempt by the United States to draw Ukraine into NATO and thereby set the stage for Russian disintegration. Quite frankly, there was some truth to the Russian perception.

If the West had succeeded in dominating Ukraine, Russia would have become indefensible. The southern border with Belarus, as well as the southwestern frontier of Russia, would have been wide open.

Russia’s Resurgence

After what Russia regarded as an American attempt to further damage it, Moscow reverted to a strategy of reasserting its sphere of influence in the areas of the former Soviet Union. The great retreat of Russian power ended in Ukraine. For the next generation, until roughly 2020, Russia’s primary concern will be reconstructing the Russian state and reasserting Russian power in the region.

Interestingly, the geopolitical shift is aligning with an economic shift. Vladimir Putin sees Russia less as an industrial power than as an exporter of raw materials, the most important of which is energy (particularly natural gas). He is transforming Russia from an impoverished disaster into a poor but more productive country. Putin also is giving Russia the tool with which to intimidate Europe: the valve on a natural gas pipeline.

But the real flash point, in all likelihood, will be on Russia’s western frontier. Belarus will align itself with Russia. Of all the countries in the former Soviet Union, Belarus has had the fewest economic and political reforms and has been the most interested in recreating some successor to the Soviet Union. Linked in some way to Russia, Belarus will bring Russian power back to the borders of the former Soviet Union.

From the Baltics south to the Romanian border there is a region where borders have historically been uncertain and conflict frequent. In the north, there is a long, narrow plain, stretching from the Pyrenees to St. Petersburg. This is where Europe’s greatest wars were fought. This is the path that Napoleon and Hitler took to invade Russia. There are few natural barriers. Therefore, the Russians must push their border west as far as possible to create a buffer. After World War II, they drove into the center of Germany on this plain. Today, they have retreated to the east. They have to return, and move as far west as possible. That means the Baltic states and Poland are, as before, problems Russia has to solve.

Defining the limits of Russian influence will be controversial. The United States — and the countries within the old Soviet sphere — will not want Russia to go too far.

Russia will not become a global power in the next decade, but it has no choice but to become a major regional power. And that means it will clash with Europe. The Russian-European frontier remains a fault line.

It is unreasonable to talk of Europe as if it were one entity. It is not, in spite of the existence of the European Union. Europe consists of a series of sovereign and contentious nation-states.

In short, post-Cold War Europe is in benign chaos. Russia is the immediate strategic threat to Europe. Russia is interested not in conquering Europe, but in reasserting its control over the former Soviet Union. From the Russian point of view, this is both a reasonable attempt to establish some minimal sphere of influence and essentially a defensive measure.

Obviously the Eastern Europeans want to prevent a Russian resurgence. The real question is what the rest of Europe might do — and especially, what Germany might do. The Germans are now in a comfortable position with a buffer between them and the Russians, free to focus on their internal economic and social problems. In addition, the heritage of World War II weighs heavily on the Germans. They will not want to act alone, but as part of a unified Europe.

Russia is the eastern portion of Europe and has clashed with the rest of Europe on multiple occasions. Historically, though, Europeans who have invaded Russia have come to a disastrous end. If they are not beaten by the Russians, they are so exhausted from fighting them that someone else defeats them. Russia occasionally pushes its power westward, threatening Europe with the Russian masses. At other times passive and ignored, Russia is often taken advantage of. But, in due course, others pay for underestimating it.

Geographic Handicaps, Energy Assets

If we are going to understand Russia’s behavior and intentions, we have to begin with Russia’s fundamental weakness — its borders, particularly in the northwest. On the North European Plain, no matter where Russia’s borders are drawn, it is open to attack. There are few significant natural barriers anywhere on this plain. Pushing its western border all the way into Germany, as it did in 1945, still leaves Russia’s frontiers without a physical anchor. The only physical advantage Russia can have is depth. The farther west into Europe its borders extend, the farther conquerors have to travel to reach Moscow. Therefore, Russia is always pressing westward on the North European Plain and Europe is always pressing eastward.

Europe is hungry for energy. Russia, constructing pipelines to feed natural gas to Europe, takes care of Europe’s energy needs and its own economic problems, and puts Europe in a position of dependency on Russia. In an energy-hungry world, Russia’s energy exports are like heroin. It addicts countries once they start using it. Russia has already used its natural gas resources to force neighboring countries to bend to its will. That power reaches into the heart of Europe, where the Germans and the former Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe all depend on Russian natural gas. Add to this its other resources, and Russia can apply significant pressure on Europe.

Dependency can be a double-edged sword. A militarily weak Russia cannot pressure its neighbors, because its neighbors might decide to make a grab for its wealth. So Russia must recover its military strength. Rich and weak is a bad position for nations to be in. If Russia is to be rich in natural resources and export them to Europe, it must be in a position to protect what it has and to shape the international environment in which it lives.

In the next decade, Russia will become increasingly wealthy (relative to its past, at least) but geographically insecure. It will therefore use some of its wealth to create a military force appropriate to protect its interests, buffer zones to protect it from the rest of the world — and then buffer zones for the buffer zones. Russia’s grand strategy involves the creation of deep buffers along the North European Plain, while it divides and manipulates its neighbors, creating a new regional balance of power in Europe. What Russia cannot tolerate are tight borders without buffer zones, and its neighbors united against it. This is why Russia’s future actions will appear to be aggressive but will actually be defensive.

Russia’s actions will unfold in three phases. In the first phase, Russia will be concerned with recovering influence and effective control in the former Soviet Union, re-creating the system of buffers that the Soviet Union provided it. In the second phase, Russia will seek to create a second tier of buffers beyond the boundaries of the former Soviet Union. It will try to do this without creating a solid wall of opposition, of the kind that choked it during the Cold War. In the third phase — really something that will have been going on from the beginning — Russia will try to prevent anti-Russian coalitions from forming.

If we think of the Soviet Union as a natural grouping of geographically isolated and economically handicapped countries, we can see what held it together. The countries that made up the Soviet Union were bound together of necessity. The former Soviet Union consisted of members who really had nowhere else to go. These old economic ties still dominate the region, except that Russia’s new model, exporting energy, has made these countries even more dependent than they were previously. Attracted as Ukraine was to the rest of Europe, it could not compete or participate with Europe. Its natural economic relationship is with Russia; it relies on Russia for energy, and ultimately it tends to be militarily dominated by Russia as well.

These are the dynamics that Russia will take advantage of in order to reassert its sphere of influence. It will not necessarily recreate a formal political structure run from Moscow — although that is not inconceivable. Far more important will be Russian influence in the region over the next five to 10 years.

The Russians will pull the Ukrainians into their alliance with Belarus and will have Russian forces all along the Polish border, and as far south as the Black Sea. This, I believe, will all take place by the mid-2010s.

There has been a great deal of talk in recent years about the weakness of the Russian army, talk that in the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union was accurate. But here is the new reality — that weakness started to reverse itself in 2000, and by 2015 it will be a thing of the past. The coming confrontation in northeastern Europe will not take place suddenly, but will be an extended confrontation. Russian military strength will have time to develop. The one area in which Russia continued research and development in the 1990s was in advanced military technologies. By 2010, it will certainly have the most effective army in the region. By 2015-2020, it will have a military that will pose a challenge to any power trying to project force into the region, even the United States.

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